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A large negative stock price reaction to a restatement announcement could imply 
a particularly significant accounting error, or one made by a firm that has a relatively 
high probability of being sued. This paper investigates the extent to which market 
reactions to restatement announcements are explained by litigation risk. We model the 
simultaneous relationship between restatement announcement abnormal returns and 
litigation risk and find that about half of the -9.2 percent average restatement 
announcement effect is due to expected litigation costs. We also find that the significance 
of the accounting error does not directly affect the magnitude of the abnormal return; it 
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The growing number of financial statement restatements and their associated 
shareholder losses have motivated new regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20022 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) earnings management initiative 
(Berton (2000), Public Accounting Report (1998)). This paper studies the marginal effect 
of litigation on restatement announcement return; i.e. whether restating firms’ stocks 
suffer such large losses because the market is surprised by particularly egregious 
accounting mistakes, or because admitting to the mistakes increases the likelihood that 
firms will face large litigation costs. We show that litigation risk accounts for about half 
of the average -9.2 percent restatement announcement abnormal return. Our paper 
contributes to the literature by estimating the marginal effect of litigation using two 
dummy endogenous variable models. The models can be used to find the embedded 
marginal effect of litigation risk for other events including seasoned equity offerings, 
debt issuances, large negative earnings surprises, insider trading, and fraud revelations.  
There are several reasons why it is important to isolate the marginal effect of 
litigation. First, policymakers are interested in the magnitude of the shareholder harm 
caused by the misinformation, which firms correct in the restatement. Because we find 
that half of the announcement return is due to a firm’s “suability” as opposed to the 
seriousness of its accounting errors, less stringent regulatory remedies could be 
appropriate. Similarly, the debate on tort reform could benefit from our evidence that 
litigation risk accounts for half of shareholder losses at restatement announcement.  
                                                 
2 Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 specifically says: “The past year has 
been marked by a series of restatements of financial statements by prominent corporations resulting in 
billions of dollars lost by investors. To address concerns raised by these restatements, and to restore public 
trust in the U.S. financial markets, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act”), which the President signed into law on July 30, 2002.” 
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Second, the stock loss at restatement announcement is often used to estimate 
damages in class action lawsuits and in academic literature that tries to establish whether 
class action lawsuits have merit (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2007), Iqbal, Shetty, and 
Wang (2007)). Our analysis shows that using the full loss overstates shareholder damages 
due to restatement because it implicitly includes greater litigation costs for firms that are 
more sueable. Third, financial analysts should be interested in disentangling the effects 
since litigation costs are one-time costs while the rest of the announcement effects may 
be related to ongoing operations. Lastly, short-sellers who trade in anticipation of 
restatements can use our results to gauge when stocks have fallen far enough to warrant 
covering their short sale.  
Several studies find that restating firms suffer an average of up to a ten percent 
abnormal stock price decline over a two day window surrounding restatement 
announcements.3 While these studies seem to imply that large negative restatement 
announcement returns are mostly due to new negative financial information, they do not 
account for the substantial litigation costs that often follow. 
Other studies contain hints that litigation risk could partly explain restatement 
announcement returns. Jones and Weingram (1997) search for stocks that fall more than 
10 percent in a single day and find that those involved in  restatements, insider trading, 
seasoned equity offerings, SEC enforcement actions, or fall-triggering announcements 
are more likely to be sued in class actions (Rule 10b-5)4. Jones and Weingram (1997) and 
Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2010) find that restating firms are substantially more likely to 
                                                 
3 See Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004), Durnev and  Mangen (2009), and others. 
4 Securities class action lawsuits filed under Rule 10b-5 allege material flaws pertaining to firms’ 
disclosure. Allegedly, firms’ misstatements cause inflation in the stock price during the class action period. 
Most of these lawsuits are filed on behalf of shareholders who bought the stock during the period of alleged 
inflated stock prices and believe they are entitled to compensation. 
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be sued than other firms. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find that 37.6 percent of restating 
companies are sued. Lowry and Shu (2002) show that initial public offerings are 
underpriced, at least partly to reduce litigation risk. But only six percent of the firms in 
their sample are sued. A much larger proportion of our restating firms are sued, enabling 
us to produce more precise estimates of the magnitude of expected litigation costs. 
Several studies examine the characteristics of firms with high litigation risk, and 
how investors account for such characteristics at the time of a corrective disclosure that 
leads to litigation (Jones and Weingram (2005), Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994)). 
In general, they find that high litigation risk firms are identifiable. Hence, investors 
should be able to anticipate the cost and the probability of a class action lawsuit at the 
time of the restatement announcement. In fact, Gande and Lewis (2009) find that the 
more likely a firm is to be sued, the larger is the anticipation effect by the market and the 
smaller is the filing date effect.  We find a similar effect for restatements. We show that 
the stock prices of more “sueable” firms start falling a month before their restatement 
announcements.  
Using model specifications that control for the endogeneity of restatement 
announcement return and litigation risk, we find that litigation risk is an important 
determinant of market reactions to restatement announcements. This result is robust to 
various specifications. A ten percent increase in the likelihood of litigation decreases 
announcement period two-day cumulative abnormal return by approximately 1.42 
percent.5 We estimate that roughly half (-4.8 percent) of the average -9.2 percent 
announcement abnormal return is due to expected litigation costs.  This corresponds to an 
                                                 
5 This estimate is made by averaging all coefficients on the proxy for litigation risk in all models in Tables 
5, 6 and 7. 
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average loss of $115 million in shareholder wealth at the announcement of a restatement, 
$60 million of which is lost due to expected litigation costs.  
Some firms’ stocks suffer particularly large declines because of more serious 
restatements, such as those due to irregularity or those that affect core accounts. Our 
method allows us to show that those issues increase the firms’ probability of being sued, 
but provide little new information used by investors to reassess firms’ operating cash 
flows. Apparently, by the time a restatement is announced, investors have already 
inferred a good deal of the restatement information using other sources, which is 
consistent with the findings of Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011). We show that a 
substantial portion of the loss at the restatement announcement is due to details that allow 
investors to better estimate the probability that a restating firm will be sued.6  
Intentional mistakes could increase litigation risk more than unintentional 
mistakes. Indeed, we control for this possibility by distinguishing between restatements 
with and without irregularities. Prior studies suggest that plaintiff attorneys will pursue 
the cases with the highest expected payoffs. Therefore, “deep pocket” firms that restate 
due to a simple computation error can get sued, while empty pocket firms with 
accounting irregularities might not. Even after controlling for the effect of irregularities, 
our finding of a negative relation between restatement announcement period return and 
the likelihood of litigation remains significant.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses and 
empirical methods. Section 3 describes explanatory variables that are included in our 
                                                 
6 While investors assess the probability of a firm being sued before a restatement is announced, that 
probability is likely to be small if many firms manipulate earnings but never restate. When the firm admits 
to the error and restates, the probability of a lawsuit jumps and stock price takes a large hit. 
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model. The data are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Issue, Hypothesis Development, and Empirical Methods 
2.1. The issue illustrated 
Figure 1 starkly illustrates the issue of this paper. Using our sample of restating 
firms, Figure 1.A reproduces the typical pattern of abnormal returns observed in earlier 
studies around restatement announcements. The average abnormal return on the day of 
and the day following the restatement announcement is about -9 percent. But this masks 
significant differences between sued and non-sued firms. Figure 1.B shows that average 
two-day abnormal return of firms that were sued is much lower (about -20 percent) than 
that of non-sued firms (about -4 percent). A -4 percent average market reaction to an 
announcement is substantial, but an average -20 percent reaction for the sued firms 
suggests that expected litigation costs could be relatively more important than the 
seriousness of the accounting errors.  
<<< Insert Figure 1 here >>> 
Figure 1.B shows that the return pattern in Figure 1.A. is largely driven by the 
restating firms that are sued. Compared to non-sued firms, sued firms’ shareholders start 
to anticipate a costly problem well before the restatement announcement, and after a 
sharp two day drop at the announcement, the total price decline is maintained or increases 
somewhat. Non-sued firms’ show little pre-announcement effects and they recoup their 
two day loses shortly after the announcement. The fleeting announcement effect for non-
sued firms implies that any firm revaluation due to their restatements is minimal.  
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For sued firms, investors appear to sense financial weakness up to 30 days prior to 
their restatements. Sued firms suffer -20 percent abnormal returns on average during the 
period from day -30 through day -2, and suffer another -20 percent decline at restatement 
announcement (days zero and plus one). Such a large negative market reaction after an 
already substantial decline suggests either a surprisingly large accounting problem, or 
that shareholders anticipate that the restatement itself could bring on large additional 
costs, e.g., litigation costs. Although we find that sued firms commit somewhat more 
serious accounting errors than non-sued firms, the magnitude and endurance of 
restatement day abnormal returns for the sued firms is surprising.  
To sort out the differential effect of litigation risk and the magnitude of the 
accounting error, one must recognize that firms’ litigation risks and their restatement-
related abnormal returns are interdependent. Lawsuits present a major expense to 
shareholders, therefore, more “sueable” restating firms should have more negative market 
reactions to their restatement announcements, all else equal. On the other hand, Jones and 
Weingram (1997) show that the likelihood of litigation is greater after large one day stock 
price declines. Therefore, we model the relation between restatement announcement 
returns and litigation risk as a simultaneous equations system.  
 
2.2. Development of the hypothesis 
A significant market reaction to a restatement occurs if it causes the marginal investor 
to change his estimate of the net present value of future cash flows by either decreasing the 
cash flows or increasing the cost of capital. This can happen because restatements can reveal 
that past earnings were overstated and that predicted future earnings need a downward 
revision, or because of the loss of credibility of financial statements. Indeed, previous studies 
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show that the majority of restatements correct net income downward (Palmrose, Richardson 
and Scholz (2004), Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011)). Wilson (2008) finds that 
information content of earnings declines temporarily after restatements. Hribar and 
Jenkins (2004) show that analysts revise their estimates of growth rate downward 
following restatements.7 Furthermore, prior literature shows that restating firms 
experience high management turnover subsequent to restatement announcements and 
worsening of employment prospects of managers (Desai et al. (2006), Srinivasan (2004), 
Hennes, Miller, and Leone (2008)).8  
Restatements also increase the likelihood of litigation. They increase the 
likelihood of litigation more than equity issuance, insider trading, SEC enforcement 
actions and other announcements that trigger ten percent or more drop in stock prices 
(Jones and Weingram (1997), Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2010)). Indeed, Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) report that 37.6 percent of firms restating financial statements are sued 
subsequent to restatement announcements. 
Litigation is costly to firms. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) document that the mean 
litigation resolution amount equals $50.3 million for a sample of firms that are sued as a 
result of restatements during 1995 through 1999.9 We call these costs litigation resolution 
costs. However, litigation resolution costs are only one portion of the total costs 
associated with a lawsuit. There are other, potentially more important costs including 
legal defense costs, lost reputation and the opportunity cost of management time 
dedicated to lawsuits. Lost reputation is the loss of firm value due to changes of relations 
                                                 
7 They also find that the cost of capital increases following restatements. However, the validity of this 
finding was questioned by Kasznik (2004) and others due to methodology concerns. 
8 Similar results are found for a sample of firms subject to SEC and Department of Justice enforcement 
actions for financial misrepresentation (Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2007), Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008)). 
9 This number represents strictly settlement costs paid to the litigants either as part of a settlement or as the 
result of a court order. 
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with investors, customers and suppliers (see Karpoff and Lott (1993)). We call these 
costs indirect costs of litigation. Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008) find that firms charged 
by the SEC with financial misrepresentation face substantial reputation and legal costs, 
with reputation loss costs exceeding legal costs by over 7.5 times.10 
We hypothesize that investors at least partly assess expected litigation costs at the 
time of restatement announcements, and react more negatively to restatement 
announcements that are expected to result in higher total litigation costs.11 Therefore we 
hypothesize that:  
Litigation risk hypothesis: Firms with higher expected litigation costs suffer larger stock 
price declines when they announce restatements. 
Prior literature suggests that plaintiff attorneys pursue cases that maximize their 
profit (Jones and Weingram (2005)). Moreover, Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2007) find that 
legal penalties imposed by private class actions are positively related to the size and 
severity of the damage to investors for the sample of firms that are subject to the SEC 
enforcement actions. A class action lawsuit will be initiated only when expected litigation 
resolution costs (profit to plaintiff and their attorneys) exceed some threshold.  All else 
equal, that threshold is more likely to be breached when the firm is more "sueable", for 
example, if the firm has deep pockets. Hence, a significant negative relation between the 
likelihood of litigation and restatement announcement abnormal returns is consistent with 
the litigation risk hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
10 The authors define reputation costs as “the decrease in present value of the firm's cash flows as investors, 
customers, and suppliers are expected to change the terms of trade with which they do business with the 
firm,” page 2. 
11 Gande and Lewis (2009) show that partial anticipation of lawsuits does not preempt negative market 
reaction to the announcement of litigation. 
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2.3. Description of empirical methods 
The test of the litigation risk hypothesis is not trivial because the expected 
likelihood of litigation is unobservable as are the expected costs associated with 
litigation. We do, nonetheless, observe whether or not the firm is sued. Let Litigation=1 
when the firm is sued as a result of a restatement announcement, and Litigation=0 
otherwise. To measure the expected effect of litigation on announcement period returns, 
we are interested in the expected difference in CAR01 with and without litigation. 
Wooldridge (2002, page 604) calls this expectation the average treatment effect.12 If 
Litigation were statistically independent of the difference between CARs with and 
without litigation, then the difference in mean estimator for sub-samples with and without 
litigation would be unbiased, consistent and asymptotically normal (Wooldridge (2002)).  
But this condition is not realistic for restatements. The relation between the 
market reaction to restatement announcements and litigation risk is endogenous. First, 
investors should react to restatement announcements more negatively when they believe 
that litigation risk is relatively high. Second, litigation risk has been shown to be higher 
after large one day stock declines. The relation between CAR01 and litigation risk can be 
expressed as the following system of equations. 
 
CAR01 = γ1 Litigation risk + β1 X1 + ε1      (1)  
                                                 
12 Wooldridge (2002) defines the partial effect of jx  on the conditional expectation E(y|x) as the partial 
derivative of E(y|x) with respect to jx . For example in a simple model where 
2211021 ),|( xxxxyE   , the partial effect of 1x  is 1 . If y depends on both observable and 
unobservable variables and the partial effect of jx  is a function of unobservable variables, then the partial 
effect of jx  can be averaged across the population of unobservable variables to generate average partial 
effects. Average treatment effect is the average partial effect for a binary variable.  
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Litigation risk = γ2 CAR01 + β2 X2 + ε 2      (2)  
 
The focus of this paper is to estimate equation (1) accounting for the endogeneity 
of CAR01 and litigation risk. Because CAR01 and litigation risk are endogenous, it is not 
correct to use ordinary least squares (OLS) to regress announcement abnormal returns on 
explanatory variables and a dummy variable proxy for litigation risk. The ex post 
occurrence of litigation is not exogenous, hence, the OLS assumption of independence of 
the error term and explanatory variables is violated.   
Because the only endogenous explanatory variable in equation (1) is binary, 
equation (1) is called a dummy endogenous variable model (Heckman (1978)). The 
estimate of the coefficient 1γ  in equation (1) is called the average treatment effect. It can 
be estimated using an instrumental variable approach (Wooldridge (2002), Angrist 
(2001)). This approach requires at least one instrumental variable that we denote by the 
vector Z.  Z is a member of X2 but not X1.
13
  
Wooldridge (2002) shows that parameters in equation (1) can be consistently 
estimated by the following procedure (Wooldridge (2002) page 623 procedure 18.1).14 
The first step estimates the probability of litigation using a probit model: 
Probability(Litigation = 1| X). Here, X is the union of 1X  and 2X .
15  The resulting model 
is used to generate the predicted probability of being sued for each restating firm, 
denoted iG
^
. The next step estimates the system of equations (1) and (2) using two-stage 
                                                 
13 We discuss our choice of instrumental variable in section 3. 
14 This procedure has been used to study other finance problems. Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2009) 
study the effect of performance on founder-CEO status. Zhu (2009) examines the effect of litigation risk on 
SEO performance. 
15 Recall that Z is a member of X2. 
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least squares (2SLS). The first stage is a regression of the litigation dummy variable on 
iG
^
 and X. This generates a second version of the predicted probability of litigation, 
which we denote as 
^
P (Litigation). The second stage of the 2SLS procedure estimates 
equation (1) by OLS after substituting 
^
P (Litigation) for Litigation and obtaining 2SLS 
standard errors (Wooldridge (2002) and Zhu (2009)).  
There are several advantages to using this method (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira 
(2009)). First, unlike other instrumental variable models such as 2SLS, it takes into 
consideration the binary nature of the litigation variable. Moreover, the logit model does 
not have to be correctly specified. Furthermore, there are no special problems (e.g., need 
to adjust standard errors) in estimating equation (1) in this manner when the endogenous 
variable is binary (Wooldridge (2002)). The estimated coefficients in equation (1) are 
consistent and asymptotically normal. We call this approach Method 1.  
When the purpose is to estimate only equation (1), Heckman (1978) recommends 
a simpler method for the estimation of dummy endogenous variable models. One can 
estimate a linear probability model with Litigation as a dependent variable. The 
independent variables should include all of the variables in 1X  and X2.  As long as X2 
contains at least one variable not included in X1, the model is identified and the predicted 
values of Litigation can be used as regressors in the second stage estimation of equation 
(1) because the regression residuals from the prediction of Litigation are constructed to 
be orthogonal to 1X . Standard instrumental variables results apply because it is not 
necessary to obtain consistent estimators of the parameters of reduced form equations in 
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order to consistently estimate structural equations (Heckman (1978)). We call this 
approach Method 2.16  
 Although Wooldridge (2002) suggests that his method produces estimates that 
are consistent under less restrictive conditions than Heckman’s (1978) method, we find 
similar results for both. Therefore, we present the full results for Method 1, and simply 
discuss the results for Method 2 in section 5. The next section describes the explanatory 
variables and their measurements. 
 
3. Description of explanatory variables 
To identify which variables affect the market reaction to restatement 
announcements, we consider the impact of restatements on changes in future company 
prospects, as well as the uncertainty of achieving them. This approach relies on 
discounted cash flow valuation in which stock price is determined as the present value of 
expected future cash flows. To identify which variables affect the likelihood of class 
action lawsuits, we assume that plaintiffs consider both the size of the damage and the 
likelihood of collection, as has been argued by Jones and Weingram (2005). 
To identify the system of equations, we need one or more variables that influence 
the probability of litigation but does not directly affect the announcement abnormal 
return. We use share turnover prior to the restatement announcements to play this role.  
Share turnover prior to restatement is a good candidate for litigation instrument because it 
                                                 
16 The system of equations (1) and (2) also can be estimated using the method discussed in Maddala (1983, 
page 244).16 We employ Wooldridge’s approach because it has two advantages over Maddala’s. First, it 
allows recovering of coefficients in equations (1) and (2), while Maddala’s approach does not (Maddala 
(1983), Lowry and Shu (2002), Zhu (2009)). Since the main focus of our paper is to estimate the marginal 
effect of expected litigation costs on restatement announcement returns, it is important for us to be able to 
recover the coefficients. Second, it offers estimators that are more efficient (Zhu (2009), Wooldridge 
(2002)).  
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serves as a direct input in trading models that estimate damages in class action lawsuits 
(Gande and Lewis (2009)). Since the specific harmed trades made during class action 
periods are not observed, plaintiffs estimate the number of shares harmed by alleged 
misinformation as a function of total share turnover using various methods known as 
trading models (Barclay and Torchio (2001)).17  
To establish damages, a shareholder must have bought shares at a price that 
reflects misstated earnings and sold after price adjusts following the restatement. Higher 
share turnover could, therefore, increase the probability that some shareholders bought 
shares based on misleading information and sold later after the restatement.  At the same 
time, higher share turnover can indicate lower probability that shares bought after 
misleading information was releases were held until the announcement of a restatement. 
This would suggest a negative association of share turnover and shareholder damages. In 
theory, therefore, turnover and the probability of a lawsuit could be negatively or 
positively related.  However, earlier studies by Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994), 
Gande and Lewis (2009), Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005), Files, Swanson and Tse (2009) 
and Dyl (1999) have found that the net effect of turnover on litigation probability is 
positive and significant. For our goal of identifying a valid instrument, we only require 
that turnover and the probability of litigation are significantly related.  
 Ignoring the lawsuit effect, the announcement of a restatement should change 
price only if the marginal investor changes her expectation of the present value of the 
firm’s future cash flows. Assuming no lawsuit, share turnover prior to restatement 
                                                 
17 In results not reported we also use stock price volatility as an instrument since it is also used as an input 
in some models. However, this variable is not significant in explaining the likelihood of litigation and 
therefore is not a good instrument. Including stock price volatility in the first stage model in either method 
does not affect the rest of the results. 
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announcement should not influence announcement period returns.  While it is always 
difficult to find an instrumental variable that is orthogonal to the dependent variable in 
the second equation, we feel that share turnover is a particularly strong candidate because 
it is used by law firms as a direct input in damage calculations. Share turnover has been 
used in Lowry and Shu (2002) as an instrument for litigation risk in a system of equations 
where the second endogenous variable is the initial return following an IPO. 
Share turnover can be viewed as a proxy for the probability that a share was 
traded within a given time period. Following prior literature, share turnover is calculated 
as: [1- Пt (1- volume tradedt / total sharest)] accumulated over the one-year period ending 
on the second day prior to the restatement announcement date (Пt denotes product over 
period t).18  
There are several variables that are common to both equations (1) and (2) (i.e., 
that belong to both X1 and X2). The seriousness of the restatement should affect both the 
likelihood of litigation and the announcement period returns. Holding other factors 
constant, restatements of core accounts, such as revenue and cost, are considered more 
serious than non-core account restatements. We use an indicator variable, Core, which 
equals one if the restatement involves revenue, cost of sales or operating expense 
accounts for on-going operations to control for the seriousness of the restatement.  
Restating firms in our sample also restate non-core accounts such as securities-related 
items (e.g., accounting for derivatives, warrants, stock options and convertible securities), 
                                                 
18 We reestimate our model using alternative estimation windows for share turnover. The results of the first 
stage models appear to be sensitive to those changes but not the second stage model, which is our focus.  
We chose to use (-252; -2) estimation window relative to restatement because it is consistent with both 
practice in estimating losses and previous literature. Please refer to Table 1 for precise definition of all 
variables. 
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in-process research and development (IPR&D), reclassifications, and related party 
transactions. For restatements of non-core accounts, we set Core equal to zero.  
We expect restatements of core accounts to be positively associated with the 
likelihood of litigation and negatively associated with CAR01. This is consistent with 
previous research which finds that more persistent operating income is associated with 
stronger market reactions (Kormendi and Lipe (1987)). Several studies have also shown 
that the market reacts more strongly to surprises in on-going operating income than to 
one-time special items (Elliott and Hanna (1996), Strong and Meyer (1987)). Palmrose 
and Scholz (2004) find that firms that restate core or revenue accounts have a higher 
likelihood of litigation.  
Some events leading to restatements could make it easier for the plaintiffs to win 
the lawsuit, increasing their propensity to bring a lawsuit. It is easier for lawyers to argue 
the intent to mislead if a third party initiates a restatement. To capture this effect, we 
include indicator variables for the party attributed with identifying the misstatement 
(Auditor, SEC, or Company). Managements’ integrity and competence are called into 
question if a restatement is initiated by a third party. As a result, the Auditor and SEC 
dummies should be negatively related to CAR01, while the Company dummy should be 
positively related to CAR01.  Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz’s (2004) results support 
our expectations for the effects of Auditor.  
Restatements that have more substantial impacts on previously reported financial 
statements should result in a higher likelihood of litigation and more negative CAR01. 
We measure the magnitude of the impact of restatements using variables suggested by 
prior studies (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004), Palmrose and Scholz (2004) and 
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Files, Swanson and Tse (2009)). Change in NI/Total_assets is the difference between 
average annual restated Net Income and average annual originally reported Net Income 
divided by total assets reported for the fiscal year preceding the restatement 
announcement.19 We also include an indicator variable NI crosses loss threshold, which 
takes a value of one if the restatement changes reported income into a loss and zero 
otherwise. Another variable that measures the significance of a restatement is the Number 
of periods restated, which equals the sum of periods restated, where a fiscal year=1 and 
each additional quarter=0.25. Change in NI/Total_assets should be positively related to 
CAR01 and negatively related to the likelihood of litigation. Number of periods restated 
and NI crosses loss threshold should be negatively related to CAR01 and positively 
related to the likelihood of litigation.  
We include the indicator variable No_details in both X1 and X2. No_details is an 
indicator variable that equals one if full details about a restatement were not released in 
the initial announcement. If the firm does not disclose all of the details of its restatement, 
uncertainty regarding firm prospects increases more at the restatement announcement. 
Moreover, it is likely that full details about more serious restatements will not be released 
at the initial announcement of a restatement (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004)). 
Therefore, this variable can proxy for seriousness of the restatement and should be 
positively related to the likelihood of litigation and negatively related to restatement 
announcement period returns.  
Other variables unrelated to the seriousness of the accounting mistake could be 
important. Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) suggest that markets should react 
                                                 
19 Our results remain robust to using the difference between total restated net income and total originally 
reported net income scaled by absolute value of total originally reported net income.   
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less negatively to negative announcements made by poor performing firms. Therefore, 
we include the firm’s pre-restatement stock performance, measured over 250 trading days 
preceding the announcement (Return (-252, -2)). We expect a negative coefficient on 
Return (-252, -2) in equation (1). We also include Return (-252, -2) in equation (2) 
because it has been shown that similar measures of prior performance are negatively 
associated with the likelihood of litigation (Jones and Weighram (2005), Gande and 
Lewis (2009), Files, Swanson and Tse (2009)).20   
The positive relation between a firm’s size and its legal exposure has been well 
documented in the legal literature, and is referred to as the “deep pocket” theory (Francis, 
Philbrick, and Schipper (1994), Jones and Weingram (1996), and Skinner (1997)). 
Because of the fixed costs associated with filing a lawsuit, plaintiffs initiate lawsuits only 
if they perceive the recoverable damages to be sufficiently large. Large firms may be 
better able to pay damages than a small firm. As a result, firm size measures the capacity 
to pay damages. Therefore, we include the variable Size, measured as the logarithm of 
market capitalization of the restating firm one year prior to restatement, as a determinant 
of the likelihood of litigation. Firm size is also likely to influence market reaction to 
restatements because prior studies find that for a given percent change in income, small 
companies’ stocks change more than large companies’ stocks (O’Brien and Bhushan 
(1990), El-Gazzar (1998)). This is because large firms are followed by more analysts and 
investors and consequently earnings surprises are typically small. Therefore, we include 
the variable Size in both X1 and X2.  
<<<Insert Table 1 here>>> 
                                                 
20 Return (-252, -2)  can also capture the size of the potential damages.  
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4. Data 
Restatement dates and characteristics were hand collected from the Lexis-Nexis 
and Factiva databases. The Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases were researched using key 
words “restatement,” “restat,” “revis,” “adjust,” “error” and “responding to guidance 
from the SEC” in the period January 1, 1997 through June 30, 2002. We selected this 
period for two reasons. First, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) made a 
sample of restatements announced in this period publicly available. Second, by using 
June 30, 2002 as a cut off date, all restatements precede the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and were 
therefore made in the same regulatory environment. After identifying the sample of 
companies announcing restatements, we collect data describing the restatements from 
amended SEC reports (Form 10-K/A and Form 10-Q/A). We collected the following data 
from these sources: date of the restatement announcement, years and quarters restated, 
and original and restated net income in each period. We obtain accounting and market 
variables from COMPUSTAT and return data from CRSP.  
We cross-checked our sample with the sample released by the GAO and included 
restatements from the GAO sample that were not picked up by the Lexis-Nexis and 
Factiva searches.21 In total, we identified 923 restatements or restatement announcements 
between 1997 and 2002.  Because we are interested in restatements that are attributable to 
mistakes or improper interpretation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), we excluded 130 restatements that were caused by the adoption of new 
accounting rules or changes in accounting method. We also excluded restatements if the 
required information needed to define the variables in Table 1 was not available.  Within 
this category, 187 observations were deleted because data was not available on either 
                                                 
21 The Lexis-Nexis and Factiva searches identified five restatements that were not in the GAO sample. 
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CRSP or COMPUSTAT. Other observations were excluded because of missing 
information about the restatement itself. The final sample includes 536 restatements and 
496 firms. Table 2, Panels A and B present the reasons for excluding restatements from 
our sample. Panel C of Table 2 provides information about the number of firms restating 
and the distribution of restatement announcements by year. Most of the firms (93%) 
restate their financial statements only once in our sample period. 
<<<Insert Table 2 here>>> 
5. Results 
5.1. Sample description and univariate analysis 
Table 3, Panel A shows that 180 restating firms (33.58%) were sued as a result of 
a restatement. To identify which firms have been sued due to restatements, we searched 
for announcements of lawsuits by restating firms in Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse, Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases, and checked whether a class period 
corresponds to a restatement announcement window. Most lawsuits mention restatement 
or accounting problems as a reason for the lawsuit. Class action lawsuits are filed by 
plaintiff attorneys on behalf of shareholders. Our rate of litigation is similar to the 37.6% 
rate reported by Palmrose and Scholz (2004).22  
Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) and Hennes, Miller, and Leone (2008) 
point out that the market reaction to restatements might differ depending on whether a 
restatement is due to a simple error or an irregularity.23 We define restatements due to 
irregularity using an approach common to these two papers: as restatements subject to 
                                                 
22 Only 19% of restating firms analyzed by Files, Swanson and Tse (2009) were sued. 
23 Note that we exclude restatements due to changes in accounting rules from our sample and therefore our 
study is not subject to the criticism by Hennes, Miller, and Leone (2008) of studies that wholly adopt the 
GAO sample for restatement studies. 
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SEC enforcement actions (AAER) or those that disclose an accounting irregularity or 
fraud as the reason for restatement. In our sample, 25.75% of restating firms have been 
subject to AAER and 11% report irregularity or fraud as the reason for restatement. In 
total, 30% of restating firms in our sample involve irregularity.  
Table 3, Panel B, illustrates how litigation and irregularities samples only 
partially overlap. Of firms subject to class action lawsuits, 42.22% do not involve 
irregularity. Moreover, 36.20% of restatements due to irregularity are not subject to class 
action lawsuits. As pointed out by Hennes, Miller, and Leone (2008), lawyers might not 
find it beneficial to sue all firms committing an irregularity that results in a restatement 
(e.g. smaller firms and limited damages). A chi-square test of the association suggests 
that restatements involving an irregularity are more likely to get sued. Therefore, we 
control for the effects of irregularities in our analysis. 
The majority of restatements are initiated by management (59.33%), with 19.03% 
initiated by the SEC and 8.96% by an auditor (Table 3, Panel C). However, these 
proportions vary by the sub-sample. The proportion of restatements that are initiated by 
an auditor is larger in the sub-sample of firms that are sued. The majority of restatements 
involve restatement of at least one annual report (61.57%) as opposed to just quarterly 
financial statements. This proportion is higher for the sample of sued firms (66.67%) 
compared with the sample of non-sued firms (58.99%) (Table 3, Panel C).  
The content of a restatement announcement is very heterogeneous. Some firms 
file revised financial statements at the announcement of a restatement. Others mention 
only the possibility of a restatement in their initial announcement. In our sample, 40.30% 
of the firms did not disclose the full impact of the restatement on financial statements in 
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the initial announcement (Table 3, Panel C) and such firms are more likely to be sued. 
Eleven percent of the restatements change positive net income to a loss. Approximately 
half of all restatements involve core accounts. The percentage of core restatements is 
higher in the sued sample than in the non-sued sample (68.89% compared with 41.57%) 
(Table 3, Panel C). Table 3, Panel D shows that 77% of lawsuits are filed within one 
month of the restatement announcement. 
<<<Insert Table 3 here>>> 
Table 4, Panel A shows statistics for continuous variables used in the analysis for 
the entire sample and Panel B compares sued and non-sued sub-samples. Results in Table 
4 are presented for descriptive purposes only. Our main inference is drawn from 
simultaneous equation estimation, the results of which are presented in Tables 6-9. 
<<<Insert Table 4 here>>> 
Table 4, Panel A and B, and Figure 1 show that on average, restating firms have a 
negative market reaction of -9.22 percent during a two day window around a restatement 
announcement (days zero and plus one), which corresponds to an average loss of $115 
million in shareholder wealth.24 This result is consistent with the findings of other 
researchers (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004), GAO (2002)).25 Firms that are 
sued have an average CAR01 of -20.58 percent, which represents a loss of $308 million, 
compared with an average CAR01 of only -3.67 percent for the non-sued sub-sample, 
                                                 
24 Following Gande and Lewis (2009) we calculate the daily economic dollar effect for firm j on date t as 
market capitalization of firm j’s equity on date t-1 times day t abnormal return. 
25 Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) find a 9 percent negative cumulative average abnormal return 
around a two-day restatement announcement period in a sample of 403 restatements between 1995 and 
1999. GAO, 2002 find a 10 percent negative reaction for a sample of 689 public companies announcing 
restatements from 1997 to March 2002.  
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which represents a loss of only $21 million.26 The difference in CAR01s for the two sub-
samples is statistically significant at the 1% level using a Wilcoxon test. The mean 
CAR01s for the full sample and both sub-samples are statistically different from zero at 
the 1% level.27  
Sued firms made more material mistakes and restated more periods than non-sued 
firms. Sued firms performed worse than non-sued firms in the year preceding their 
restatement announcements. Buy and hold returns calculated over one year prior to the 
restatement announcement equals -12.81% for sued firms compared to 1.89% for non-
sued firms. The difference is statistically significant. Consistent with the “deep pocket 
theory”, we find that sued firms are larger than non-sued firms. The mean market 
capitalization is $3,652.44 million for sued firms and $1,451.86 million for non-sued 
firms. As expected, sued firms have much higher share turnover one year prior to 
restatement. This result is consistent with the findings of Lowry and Shu (2002) and 
others. We also find that sued firms have higher cash flow using a one-sided test.28 
 
5.2. Testing the relation between restatement abnormal returns and litigation risk using 
Method 1 
In this section we describe our main results obtained from estimating equation (1) 
using Method 1. Equation (1) is a dummy endogenous variable model and can be 
                                                 
26 These numbers are reported for descriptive purposes only. Because of endogeneity of litigation risk and 
restatement announcement returns one cannot use the difference in returns or dollar effects of the sued and 
non-sued subsamples to make inference regarding the effect of the expected litigation costs.  After 
controlling for endogeneity, we estimate that $56 million of shareholder losses can be attributed to 
expected litigation costs (See section 5.2 and 5.3). 
27 Patell Z test was used to make statistical inference. 
28 Results using cash flow variable are discussed in section 5.4. 
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estimated using the generated instrumental variable approach described in Wooldridge 
(2002, p. 621).  
Table 5 shows the results of all steps of the estimation. The first two columns of 
Table 5, Model 1, show parameter estimates and Chi Square statistics for the single-
equation probit model with the dependent variable Litigation. The model includes all 
exogenous variables in the system of equations (1) and (2). The third column shows the 
first stage of the 2SLS with Litigation as a dependent variable. The estimated probability 
of litigation is included as a regressor, along with all variables in X1 and X2. The last step 
estimates a model explaining the CAR01 using the first stage prediction for the litigation 
probability and the exogenous variables from X1 (shown in the last column). 
We first consider the second stage model of CAR01. As predicted, we find a 
negative and significant coefficient estimate on predicted probability of litigation. This 
supports the litigation risk hypothesis and suggests that investors expect high litigation 
risk firms to bear larger costs due to restatements. A ten percent increase in the likelihood 
of litigation decreases announcement period cumulative abnormal return by 
approximately 1.47 percent.  
Firms that restate net income to a loss have more negative market reactions. The 
coefficient estimate on NI crosses loss threshold is -0.049 and is significant at the 10% 
level, consistent with Palmrose, Richardson and Sholz (2004). We also find that firms 
that do not disclose the full impact of a restatement at the time of the initial 
announcement have more negative market reactions to restatements. Firms that restate 
more periods have higher CAR01 as suggested by positive coefficient on Number of 
periods restated. A potential reason for this result is that more serious errors get caught 
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sooner. The estimated coefficient on No_Details is -0.043 and is significant at the 5% 
level, consistent with our prediction that more uncertainty about a firm’s prospects 
reduces abnormal returns around restatements.  
We also find that the market reaction differs between strong and weak performers: 
Return (-252, -2) and abnormal returns are negatively related. As predicted, weak 
performers experience less negative returns after accounting for litigation risk. This result 
is robust to estimating return over the (-252, -45) window, which excludes the period 
during which investors apparently start to anticipate a restatement and a lawsuit (Gande 
and Lewis (2009), Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011)).  
<<<Insert Table 5 here>>> 
Now we turn our attention to the probit estimation of Litigation probability (first 
two columns of the table). The most important result is that the majority of the measures 
of the seriousness of the accounting error affect the litigation probability but not the 
abnormal return directly. The coefficient estimates on Core, Irregularity, and Number of 
periods restated are all positive and statistically significant in the probit model, meaning 
that they increase the probability that a firm will be sued. From that group, only Number 
of periods restated is significant in the 2nd stage model of CAR01. Therefore, Core and 
Irregularity only affect restatement announcement returns indirectly by increasing the 
likelihood of litigation. Although we saw earlier that firms that cross the net loss 
threshold experience more negative returns at a restatement announcement, this variable 
is not significant in the model for the likelihood of litigation. 
No_Details enters the probit model with a significant positive coefficient 
estimate.  Firms that do not provide full information about the restatement (No_Details = 
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1) are significantly more likely to be sued. Because the variable No_Details is significant 
in both equations (1) and (2), it affects the abnormal return through two channels.   
Investors apparently use No_Details to estimate the probability that a firm will be sued 
and to revise their estimates of future earnings and operating performance.  
Stock return performance prior to restatement has different, and partially 
offsetting impacts on the likelihood of litigation and CAR01. The results show that weak 
performance increases the likelihood of litigation (thereby indirectly lowering the 
abnormal return), but also directly increases abnormal returns. The increase in litigation 
probability is consistent with Gande and Lewis (2009) and Jones and Weingram (1996), 
who show that lawyers target poor performers.  
Finally, the probit shows that larger firms are more likely to be sued, consistent 
with the notion that deep pockets attract more lawsuits. Greater share turnover 
significantly increases the likelihood of litigation. Note that the coefficient on share 
turnover is highly significant in the probit model, suggesting that it is a strong instrument. 
 
5.3. Re-estimating the relations using Method 2 
To check the robustness of our results, we estimate the system of equations (1) 
and (2) using the method described in Heckman (1978). The results are very similar to 
those obtained using Method 1 and are not shown for brevity. The only difference is that 
the estimates using Method 2 provide weak evidence that firms whose restatements are 
initiated by the SEC are less likely to be sued. One possible explanation for this result is 
that restatements initiated by the SEC are more technical in nature and are more likely to 
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result from misinterpretation of GAAP rather than serious mistakes (Palmrose, 
Richardson and Scholz (2004)).  
 
5.4. Sensitivity analysis 
To further test the robustness of our results, we perform a number of sensitivity 
tests. First, we use cash flow instead of firm size to proxy for the capacity to pay 
damages. Following Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), we define cash flow as 
operating income before extraordinary items and deprecation, less dividends.29 An 
advantage to using the cash flow measure is that it has statistically insignificant 
correlation of less than 1% with share turnover, while firm size has a small positive 
correlation of 0.28.30  
Table 6 shows our main model, replacing firm size with cash flow. The results are 
largely unchanged. We continue to find a positive and highly significant association 
between share turnover and the likelihood of litigation. The insignificant estimate on cash 
flow is not surprising because cash flow is much noisier over time than size. The 
coefficient estimate on our main variable of interest, predicted probability of litigation, 
remains negative and significant and is similar in magnitude to that found in Table 5.  
<<<Insert Table 6 here>>> 
                                                 
29 Our results are robust to using two other definitions of cash flows. Our second definition follows Dechow 
(1994), Gatchev, Pulvino and Tarhan (2010) among others, and calculates cash flow as operating income 
before depreciation less net interest expense less cash taxes less the change in net working capital. Net 
working capital is defined as ((total current assets – cash and equivalents) – (total current liabilities – debt 
in current liabilities)). Lastly, we define cash flow as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation 
and amortization and plus deferred taxes, as in Moyen (2004). In the paper, we report the results using cash 
flow measure that has the least number of missing observations. 
30 The coefficient on share turnover and the rest of the results are not affected by elimination of firm size 
suggesting little effect from multicollinierity. 
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Second, because Change in NI/Total_assets is not available for firms that did not 
disclose full details about their restatements, we repeat the analysis including the 
interaction of No_Details with Change in NI/Total_assets. We report the results in Table 
7. Our results are basically unchanged. 
<<<Insert Table 7 here>>> 
We also explored other model specifications which we discuss here but for space 
reasons do not provide full model details. We distinguish between restatements of annual 
reports and restatements of only quarterly reports by including a dummy variable Annual. 
Annual equals one if a restatement includes a revision of at least one annual report; and 
zero otherwise. Since annual financial statements are audited by a third party, their 
restatements are inherently different. We exclude Number of periods restated from this 
specification because it is highly correlated with Annual. We find that abnormal returns 
do not differ between restatements of annual and quarterly reports, and the predictive 
power of other variables is unchanged.  
We also replicate our results using a more robust measure of firm performance 
prior to restatement announcement. We replace Return (-252, -2) with buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns of restating firms relative to a sample of control firms for the fourth 
quarter of the error period.31  The control firms were selected to match the restating firms 
in terms of size and book-to-market ratio one year before the first mistake is made. The 
sample size drops to 380 restatements because of the missing data necessary for 
matching, but the results remain robust to using this measure of prior firm performance. 
                                                 
31 The error period is defined as the period between the start of the first year or quarter restated and the 
restatement announcement date.  The total error period is then divided into fourths.  Thus the term quarter 
as used here does not refer to a calendar quarter, but a time period equal to 1/4th of the error period.  For 
example, if the company made a mistake in 1997 and announced a restatement of its 1997 annual report on 
March 15, 1998, the error period would span  January 1, 1997 – March 15, 1998 and equal 1.20 years. 
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Prior literature suggested that volatility of returns prior to disclosure of 
irregularity can also determine litigation. We find that sued and non-sued firms do not 
differ with respect to volatility of stock return calculated over the year prior to 
restatement announcement.32 Gande and Lewis (2009) and Bradley, Cline and Lian 
(2010) also find that volatility is not a significant predictor of litigation. We rerun our 
models including volatility and find that consistent with univariate analysis the 
coefficient estimate on volatility is not significant in determining the likelihood of 
litigation and the on other estimates are not affected.  
Next, we re-estimate the models excluding second and third restatements by the 
same firm. Announcement of the first restatement by the firm is likely to have a much 
larger impact on its stock price. In fact, several firms, such as Rite Aid, that announced 
several restatements in our sample period restate the same 10-Ks and 10-Qs several 
times. The first restatement announcement is likely to undermine the confidence of 
investors in the quality of firm’s financial statements and management’s competence 
more than the second and third restatements. Again, results for this slightly smaller 
sample are little changed.  
We also control for restatements that affect only the timing of income recognition 
by including a dummy variable to identify Timing restatements. Such restatements do not 
impact the value of past cash flows or earnings and therefore should have less negative 
announcement period abnormal returns. We find that the coefficient estimates on Timing 
are statistically insignificant. 
                                                 
32 Volatility is calculated as the daily standard deviation of the rate of return over the one year prior to the 
restatement announcement. 
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Most litigation studies find that firms in financial, technology, retail and highly 
regulated industries are more likely to be sued. When we include dummy variables for 
these industries in the models for litigation risk none are significant predictors of 
litigation and the rest of the results are unaffected.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Litigation imposes substantial costs on firms. Attorney fees, the costs of 
management time allocated to the lawsuit, reputation costs, and settlement costs represent 
a large potential liability for restating firms. When firms announce restatements, it is 
likely that investors simultaneously assess the implication of restatements for firm 
operations as well as potential litigation costs. This paper focuses on the litigation risk 
effect using a simultaneous equations model to account for endogeneity. 
Results show that firms with higher litigation risk have much larger negative 
market reactions to restatement announcements, controlling for other determinants of 
market reaction. A ten percent increase in the likelihood of litigation decreases 
announcement period cumulative abnormal return by approximately 1.43 percent. We 
also find that most measures of the seriousness of the accounting errors directly affect 
only the probability of being sued, not the magnitude of the restatement announcement 
abnormal return. The seriousness of the restatement only affects the restatement 
announcement abnormal return indirectly by increasing the probability of litigation. 
We show in Figure 1.B that sued restating firms experience negative abnormal 
returns over the 30 trading days prior to the announcement. Investors apparently start 
learning that the firm has serious undisclosed problems well before the restatement. A 
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restatement announcement can produce additional large negative abnormal returns if it 
provides information that investors interpret as raising the likelihood of costly litigation. 
The restatement announcement is a large negative surprise, not because it informs 
investors much about the true (weaker) financial state of the firm, but because it sheds 
new light on the likelihood that the firm will be sued and will have to bear significant 
litigation costs.  
Our results have implications for prior studies of restatement announcements that 
do not account for litigation risk. For example, the large negative abnormal returns 
reported in earlier studies do not necessarily imply that most restating firms committed 
egregious accounting errors, and that disclosure regulations should therefore be tightened.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal returns around restatement announcement 
Figures show market model cumulative average abnormal return for 60 days surrounding restatement 
announcements. Market model parameters are estimated over a 250 day period starting on day -46 relative 
to restatement. 
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Table 1: Definition of variables 
This table defines variables that are used to identify equations (1) and (2). Z is a vector of instrumental variables 
for predicting the likelihood of litigation and is part of X2 but not X1. Variables are listed in alphabetical order. 
CAR01 = γ1 Litigation risk + β1 X1 + ε1  (1)  
Litigation risk = γ2 CAR01 + β2 X2 + ε 2  (2)  
 
Variable name Variable definition Matrix 
Annual A dummy variable that equals one if restatement includes a revision of at least one 
annual report; and equals zero if only quarterly financial statements were restated. X1 and X2
Auditor A dummy that equals one if auditor initiated restatement. X1 and X2
CAR01 Market model cumulative abnormal return for days zero and plus one relative to 
restatement. Market model is estimated over a 250 day period starting on day -46 
relative to restatement using value-weighted CRSP index of NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ companies. X1 and X2
Cash Flow Operating income before extraordinary items and deprecation less dividends. This 
variable is winzorized at 5% due to high skewness. X1 and X2
Change in 
NI/Total_assets 
The difference between average annual restated Net Income and average annual 
originally reported Net Income divided by total assets reported for the fiscal year 
preceding the restatement announcement. Average annual restated (originally 
reported) Net Income is calculated as total restated (originally reported) Net Income 
divided by Number of Periods Restated and multiplied by 4. X1 and X2
Company A dummy that equals one if company’s management initiated restatement. X1 and X2 
Core A dummy that equals one if a restatement involved revenue, cost of sales or 
operating expense accounts for on-going operations, and zero otherwise. 
X1 and X2 
Irregularity A dummy that equals one if the company announced fraud or an irregularity as a 
reason for restatement or if restating firm was subject to AAER as a result of a 
restatement. 
X1 and X2 
Litigation Dummy that equals one if the firm was sued because of restatement in class action 
lawsuit. 
No_Details A dummy that equals one if full details about a restatement were not released in the 
initial announcement.
X1 and X2 
NI crosses loss 
threshold 
Takes a value of one if restatement changes reported income into loss and zero 
otherwise. 
X1 and X2 
Number of 
periods restated 
The number of periods restated in years. If the firm restated one annual report, this 
variable will equal 1. If the firm restated one annual report and one quarterly report, 
this variable will equal 1.25.
X1 and X2 
SEC A dummy that equals one if SEC initiated restatement. X1 and X2 
Return               
(-252, -2) 
Buy and hold stock return, measured over one year estimation period preceding 
restatement announcement date.
X1 and X2 
Share turnover Probability that a share was traded within a given time period. It is calculated as: [1-
Пt (1- volume tradedt / total sharest)] accumulated over the one-year period ending 
on the second day prior to the restatement announcement date.
Z 
Size Logarithm of the market capitalization of restating firm one year prior to 
restatement. 
X1 and X2 
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Table 2. Restatement sample description 
Restatement dates and characteristics were hand collected from the Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases. The Lexis-
Nexis and Factiva databases were searched using key words “restatement” “restat” “revis” “adjust” “error” and 
“responding to guidance from the SEC” during the period January 1, 1997 - June 30, 2002. We cross checked our 
sample with the sample released by the GAO. Unlike the GAO sample, we excluded restatements that were caused 
by an adoption of new accounting rules, and retained only restatements due to a mistake or an improper 
interpretation of GAAP rules. After identifying the sample of companies announcing restatements, we find further 
data on restatements in amended statements (Form 10-K/A(s) and Form 10-Q/A(s)). 
  
Panel A: Sample selection  
Source Number of restatements
GAO sample   918
 Less deleted restatements 387
  531 
Additional restatements  5
Total sample   536 
  
Panel B: Reasons for deleting GAO restatements 
Reason for deleting   Number of restatements
Data not available on either CRSP or Compustat 187
New rule adoption  114
 
In the sample period, companies adopted the following rules FASB 101, FASB 133, 
EIC-113, EITF 00-10, EITF 00-14, FASB 142, etc. Approximately 50% of new rule 
adoption restatements are due to adoption of FASB 101 revenue recognition rule.  
Change in method of accounting 16
No restatement was made despite the announcement of a possibility of restatement 20
No information found regarding restatement 25
Other*  25
    387 
  
Panel C: Number of restatements and restating firms 
Number of restatements by 
same firm in the sample period Number of restating firms Number of restatements
1 461 461 
2 30 60 
3 5 15 
  496 536 
   
Panel D: Restatements by year 






2002 (through June 30, 2002) 75
  536 
*16 of the restatement announcements in GAO sample were not announcements of new restatements, but rather 
releases of new information regarding already announced restatement. We deleted such announcements. This category 
also includes restatements that were not a result of a mistake or a misinterpretation of accounting rules (for example 
restatements due to changes in the number of shares). 
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Table 3: Restatement sample summary statistics of binary variables 
This table shows summary statistics for binary variables for a sample of firms restating financial statements during the 
period of January 1, 1997 - June 30, 2002. Litigation is a dummy that equals one if the firm was sued because of a 
restatement. We search for the announcement of a class action lawsuit in Lexis-Nexis and Factiva and check whether 
the announcement specially mentions restatement as a reason for the lawsuit.  Irregularity is a dummy that equals one 
if the company announced fraud or an irregularity as a reason for restatement or if restating firm was subject to AAER 
as a result of a restatement. Auditor, SEC and Management are dummy variables that equal one if restatements were 
initiated by auditor, SEC and management, respectively. Annual is a dummy variable that equals one if restatement 
includes a revision of at least one annual report; and equals zero if only quarterly financial statements were restated. 
Quarterly is a dummy that equals one when Annual=0. No_Details is a dummy that equals one if full details about a 
restatement were not released in the initial announcement. NI crosses loss threshold equals one if a restatement 
changes reported income into a loss and equals zero otherwise. Core is a dummy that equals one if a restatement 
involved revenue, cost of sales or operating expense accounts for on-going operations, and equals zero otherwise. The 
difference in sub-samples in Panel B is tested using a chi-square test of association *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
 
Panel A: Litigation and irregularity 
Characteristic Yes as a % No as a %
Litigation 180 33.58% 356 66.42%
Irregularity 163 30.04% 373 69.59%
   AAER 138 25.75% 398 74.25%
   Firm discloses irregularity or fraud 59 11.01% 477 88.99%
   
 




As a percent of total 
(536)
As a percent of 
Litigation=Yes 
(180) 
As a percent of 
Irregularity=Yes 
(163)
Yes Yes 104 19.40% 57.78% 63.80%
Yes No 76 14.18% 42.22% N/A
No Yes 59 11.01% N/A 36.20%
No No 297 55.41% N/A N/A
Chi-square test of association = 95.91 (p-value<0.01)   
   
Panel C: Description of dummy variables for restatements with and without litigation  
Binary variables 














as a %  
of 356 
Auditor 48 8.96% 43 23.89% 24 6.74% 2.73*
SEC 102 19.03% 24 13.33% 69 19.38%  
Company 318 59.33% 33 18.33% 196 55.06%  
     
Annual 330 61.57% 120 66.67% 210 58.99% 2.98*
Quarterly 206 38.43% 60 33.33% 146 41.01%  
     
No_Details 216 40.30% 108 60.00% 108 30.34% 30.18***
NI crosses loss 
threshold 60 11.19% 25 13.89% 35 9.83% 1.98
Core 272 50.75% 124 68.89% 148 41.57% 20.35***
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Table 3 (continued): Restatement sample summary statistics of binary variables 
 
Panel D: Number of days between restatement and litigation announcements 
Number of Calendar Days between 
Restatement and Litigation Announcements
Number of 
restatements As a % 
0 18 10% 
1 28 16% 
2 13 7% 
3 10 6% 
4 7 4% 
less than 30 139 77% 
less than 60 151 84% 







Table 4: Restatement sample summary statistics of continuous variables 
This table describes the continuous variables for a sample of firms restating financial statements during the period of January 1, 1997 - June 30, 2002. CAR01 is a 
market model cumulative abnormal return for days zero and plus one relative to a restatement announcement. Market model parameters are estimated over a 250 day 
period starting on day -46 relative to restatement using value weighted market index. Change in NI/Total_assets is the difference between restated Net Income and 
originally reported Net Income divided by total assets reported in the year preceding restatement announcement. If more than one period is restated, Net Income for 
all restated periods is added up. Number of periods restated is the number of periods restated in years. If the firm restated one annual report, this variable will equal 1. 
If the firm restated one annual report and one quarterly report, this variable will equal 1.25.  Return (-252, -2) is the buy and hold stock return, measured over the one 
year period preceding the restatement announcement date. Size is the market capitalization reported at the year end prior to the restatement announcement. Share 
turnover is the probability that a share was traded within a given time period. It is calculated as: [1- Пt (1- volume tradedt / total sharest)] accumulated over the one-
year period ending on the second day prior to the restatement announcement date.  Cash flow equals operating income before extraordinary items and deprecation 
less dividends, and is winzorized at 5%. The Wilcoxon Test tests for significant differences between sued and non-sued restating firms. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
Variables Mean Median Std Dev N
CAR01 -9.22% -3.93% 18.05% 506
Change in NI/Total_assets -5.06 -0.04 75.05 494
Number of periods restated 1.37 1.00 1.05 536
Return (-252, -2) -2.99% -23.47% 143.25% 524
Size (in millions) 2,173.65 182.87 8,906.85 500
Share turnover 0.679 0.733 0.270 524
Cash flow (in millions) 106.28 9.53 235.07 492
 
Panel B: Comparison of sued and non-sued sub-samples  
 Sued restating firms Non-sued restating firms
Wilcoxon testVariables Mean Median Std Dev N Mean Median Std Dev N
CAR01 -20.58% -16.17% 22.74% 166 -3.67% -2.02% 11.81% 340 -9.28***
Change in NI/Total_assets -0.442 -0.070 2.006 162 -7.314 -0.024 91.495 332 -4.92***
Number of periods restated 1.622 1.250 1.136 180 1.242 1.000 0.983 356 3.88***
Return (-252, -2) -12.81% -41.47% 202.60% 174 1.89% -17.78% 101.66% 350 -4.31***
Size (in millions) 3,652.44 288.54 12,935.32 164 1,451.86 132.52 5,929.78 336 4.38***
Share turnover 0.818 0.903 0.203 174 0.611 0.630 0.273 350 8.55***




Table 5: Determinants of market reaction to restatements using method 1 (Model 1) 
This table examines the determinants of market reaction to restatements controlling for litigation risk using a simultaneous-equation 
approach, where announcement period cumulative abnormal return (CAR01) and litigation probability are treated as endogenous 
variables (see Wooldridge, 2002).   The first step estimates the probability of litigation using a maximum likelihood probit model: 
Probability(Litigation = 1| X1 , X2). The model is used to generate a first step predicted probability of being sued for each restating 
firm, iG
^
.  The next step estimates the system of equations, (1) and (2), using two-stage least squares (2SLS).  The first stage of the 
2SLS estimation is a regression of the dummy variable Litigation on iG
^
, X1 , and X2, which is used to generate a second version of 
the predicted probability of litigation, denoted 
^
P (Litigation).  The second stage of the 2SLS procedure estimates equation (1) by 
OLS after substituting 
^
P (Litigation) for Litigation, and produces 2SLS standard errors. Please refer to Table 1 for variable 
definitions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
  
 Probit ML 2SLS 2SLS
                                                                      
                   
Dependent 
variable=Litigation
1st  Stage             
Dependent 
variable=Litigation













          
^
P (Litigation)     - -0.147 -2.78*** 
Predicted probability of litigation  iG
^
  0.993 3.74***   
 
Restatement and firm characteristics:   
Change in NI/Total_assets 0.001 0.02 0.000 -0.01 + 0.000 -1.30
NI crosses loss threshold 0.346 2.34 0.000 0.00 - -0.049 -1.88*
Number of periods restated 0.163 4.90** -0.001 -0.03 - 0.014 1.82*
Irregularity 1.094 50.96*** 0.003 0.06 - -0.007 -0.42
Core 0.377 6.26*** 0.005 0.05 - -0.010 -0.40
Auditor 0.283 0.68 -0.009 -0.11 - -0.034 -0.96
SEC -0.370 1.58 -0.007 -0.09 - -0.008 -0.30
Company 0.227 0.79 -0.001 -0.02 + -0.023 -0.92
No_Details 0.343 5.18** 0.007 0.15 - -0.043 -2.38**
Return (-252, -2) -0.098 5.11** 0.002 0.12 Control -0.018 -3.43***
Size 0.094 5.91** -0.001 -0.12 Control 0.007 1.58
Intercept -3.603 77.45*** 0.002 0.01  -0.016 -0.66
   
Instrument for Probability of Litigation:         
Share turnover 2.124 43.45*** 0.013 0.08  
     
Number of Observations 483 483  464
Adjusted R squared  35.03%  11.38%






Table 6: Determinants of market reaction to restatements using method 1 (Model 2) 
 
Model 2 replaces firm size with cash flow. 
 
This table uses Method 1 described in the legend to Table 5 and differs from Table 5 in that it replaces Size with Cash flow. See Table 
1 for variable definitions and the legend in Table 5 for the description of the simultaneous-equation approach used in the estimation. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
  
 Probit ML 2SLS 2SLS
                                                                      
                   
Dependent 
variable=Litigation
1st  Stage             
Dependent 
variable=Litigation













          
^
P (Litigation)     - -0.131 -2.71*** 
Predicted probability of litigation  iG
^
  1.065 3.79***    
 
Restatement and firm characteristics:   
Change in NI/Total_assets 0.001 0.02 0.000 0.00 + 0.000 -1.29
NI crosses loss threshold 0.269 1.46 -0.005 -0.08 - -0.046 -1.84*
Number of periods restated 0.156 4.25** -0.004 -0.17 - 0.013 1.62
Irregularity 1.108 51.11*** -0.003 -0.06 - -0.005 -0.3
Core 0.345 5.34** -0.021 -0.20 - -0.016 -0.62
Auditor 0.292 0.72 -0.011 -0.12 - -0.023 -0.62
SEC -0.336 1.33 0.001 0.01 - -0.009 -0.31
Company 0.161 0.42 -0.001 -0.02 + -0.025 -1.02
No_Details 0.325 4.64** 0.000 0.00 - -0.040 -2.24**
Return (-252, -2) -0.085 3.85** 0.003 0.24 Control -0.017 -3.37***
Cash flow 0.0003 0.73 0.000 -0.04 Control 0.0001 1.58
Intercept -3.173 78.96*** 0.017 0.16  -0.025 -1.01
   
Instrument for Probability of Litigation:         
Share turnover 2.311 53.55*** -0.031 -0.18  
     
Number of Observations 476 476  457
Adjusted R squared  33.75%  11.06%
F statistic [Log Likelihood] [-208.72] 19.62***  5.73***
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Table 7: Determinants of the market reaction to restatements using method 1 (Model 3) 
 
Model 3 includes interaction of No_Details and Change in NI/Total_assets 
 
This table uses Method 1 described in the legend to Table 5 and differs from Table 5 in that it adds the interaction of the variables 
No_Details and Change in NI/Total_assets. See Table 1 for variable definitions and the legend in Table 5 for the description of the 
simultaneous-equation approach used in the estimation. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
 
 Probit ML 2SLS  2SLS
                                                                      
                    
Dependent 
variable=Litigation
1st  Stage            
Dependent 
variable=Litigation  













          
^
P (Litigation)            - -0.147 -2.77*** 
Predicted probability of litigation  iG
^
 0.984 3.70***    
 
Restatement and firm characteristics:    
Change in NI/Total_assets 0.000 0.01 0.017 0.11  + 0.000 -1.31
NI crosses loss threshold 0.347 2.35 0.000 -0.02  - -0.049 -1.88*
Number of periods restated 0.166 5.04** 0.001 0.01  - 0.015 1.83*
Irregularity 1.090 50.44*** 0.000 -0.02  - -0.008 -0.43
Core 0.375 6.17*** 0.003 0.08  - -0.010 -0.41
Auditor 0.300 0.76 0.007 0.08  - -0.033 -0.92
SEC -0.373 1.61 -0.009 -0.1  - -0.009 -0.3
Company 0.228 0.80 -0.007 -0.1  + -0.023 -0.92
No_Details 0.346 5.26** -0.001 -0.01  - -0.042 -2.36**
No_Details*(Change in NI/Total_assets) 0.026 0.16 0.007 0.16  - 0.001 0.24
Return (-252, -2) -0.099 5.14** 0.000 -0.03  Control -0.018 -3.43***
Size 0.094 5.99***  0.001 0.11  Control 0.007 1.58
Intercept -3.607 77.62*** -0.001 -0.11   -0.052 -1.55
   
Instrument for Probability of Litigation:   
Share turnover 2.121 43.38*** 0.017 0.11   
   
Number of Observations 483 483   463
Adjusted R squared  34.91%   11.47%  
F statistic [Log Likelihood] [-207.78] 19.46***   5.61***
 
 
 
 
